Neuroethology is a branch of biology that studies the neural basis of naturally occurring animal behavior. This science, particularly a recent program called computational neuroethology, has a similar structure to the interdisciplinary endeavor of cognitive science.
Introduction
One of the principle goals of Cognitive Science (CogSci) is the understanding of mechanisms capable of generating intelligent behavior. This goal has two components.
First, there is the "scientific" goal of discovering the mechanisms which mediate intelligent behavior in the paradigm example of an intelligent system, humans. This is the goal of understanding how it is that humans can reason, plan, play chess, communicate, and all the other cognitive capacities that have so fascinated cognitive scientists over the past four decades. Second, there is the "engineering" goal of discovering the variety of ways intelligent behavior can be produced. Cognitive science, since its inception, has taken as one of its goals the study of intelligent behavior in general, regardless of the mechanism of its production.
The first goal seeks a specific understanding of humans and how we do the sorts of things that we do. The second goal seeks an understanding of cognition in general. With respect to some cognitively interesting task, say the task of understanding a written passage of text, the first goal seeks to understand the single, actual mechanism that enables humans to carry out that task. The second goal involves an exploration of "the space of possible mechanisms" capable of carrying out the task. I do not wish to suggest that this bipartite goal captures everything that CogSci ever tries to do, but I believe it represents a relatively noncontroversial desideratum of the field.
The argument of this paper is that a comparative approach to the questions of CogSci can further these two goals. My reason for saying this is that the biological science of computational neuroethology (CNE) pursues much the same goals with respect to non-human animals and comparative evidence has played a central role in that science's approach to its related questions. The related goals of CogSci and CNE provides prima facie motivation to investigate whether comparative evidence can do for CogSci what it has done and continues to do for CNE. In this paper, I will explore the implications of the analogy that, traditionally construed, what CogSci is to humans, neuroethology is to non-human animals. In particular, I want to explore the possibility of refashioning contemporary CogSci in the image of "Neuroethology and CogSci," Keeley DRAFT: Please, do not cite. Comments welcome Page 3 neuroethology; to explore the possibility of a neuroethology of cognitive behavior, in both human and non-human animals.
This paper has two main parts. First, I will complete Section I by continuing my introduction of the science of neuroethology. Then, I will turn to the area of greatest difference between this science and CogSci as it is traditionally construed: More so than CogSci, Neuroethology is explicitly comparative in its approach. The evolutionary history of its subjects plays a much larger role than the evolutionary history of humans does in CogSci. I
argue that CogSci ought to be more comparative in its approach and outline the various ways in which comparative research can inform CogSci. However, before getting into all of that, we need to continue with a little more introductory stage-setting.
What is computational neuroethology?
Coined independently by Randall Beer (1990) , Dave Cliff (1991a , b, 1995 , and Walter Heiligenberg (1991a) , Computational neuroethology (CNE) conjoins contemporary computational techniques (computational modeling, robotics, etc.) with the traditional concerns of neuroethology. Ethology is the study of animal behavior in natural contexts; for example, the study of electric fish social behavior in the lowland streams of Panama and in ecologically valid laboratory settings. Neuroethology is the study of the neural basis of animal behavior; for example, the study of how an electric fish nervous system enables the organism to perceive electrical stimuli. Computational neuroethology is the application of contemporary computational modeling methods and concepts to neuroethology. The work is "computational" in two senses. First, these neuroethologists sometimes build robotic and computational models of animal behavior. Second, they often theoretically model organisms as computational systems, i.e., as systems which carry out computations over sensory representations. So, for example, Heiligenberg (1991b) lays out the "computational rules"
that underlie sensory-motor processing in several species of electric fish.
More formally, we can identify several distinctive features of CNE: 1 1. Keeley (forthcoming, §III) is a long and detailed discussion of the various contributions and limitations of the various sub-fields of neuroethology. The reader is directed to it to augment the discussion presented here.
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Domain: The domain of neuroethological inquiry is all aspects of naturally occurring animal behavior. This includes the adaptive character of behavior, both to the individual organism and to the species. Neuroethologists want to know why animals behave the way they do; they want to understand the function of behavior. This desire to discover the appropriate way to characterize behavior-to understand its function-is central to CNE.
However, beyond characterizing behavior, neuroethologists wish to understand how the behavior they characterize is brought about in individual organisms. The "neuro-" in neuroethology points to the goal of understanding the neural basis-the proximal cause-of naturally occurring animal behavior. The nervous system is a significant medium through which evolution can effect behavior.[*** Tinbergen] These twin foci-the characterization of behavior and neural mechanisms of its production-are independent but related. The same behavior (i.e., behavior with the same adaptive value to an organism) can be produced by different mechanisms in different organisms. At the same time, the same mechanism can be put to different uses in different animals. Furthermore, in practice, the understanding of mechanisms and behaviors goes hand in hand. There are numerous examples in neuroethology in which the characterization of a behavior has been influenced by discoveries about mechanism of its production, as well as examples of the opposite direction of influence.
Techniques: CNE cannot usefully be defined by reference to any widely used set of experimental and analytical techniques. CNE is remarkable for its openness to practically any kind of technique which might reasonably be expected to shed light on the nature of animal behavior. A survey of neuroethological laboratories and neuroethological publications will reveal a plethora of approaches. In the same lab, one might expect to find scientists pursuing single-cell recording, immunohistochemistry, mitochondrial DNA analysis, field studies, numerical modeling, etc., etc. So, animals might share a close phylogenetic connection, or a similar ecological niche and resulting collection of adaptive behaviors. However, in addition to these, they might also share related mechanisms, even when the ultimate function of these mechanisms is very different. At first blush, one might think that echolocation in owls has little or nothing to do with electroreception in weakly electric fish. This initial impression would be wrong, because it turns out that both functions (echolocation and electroreception) are carried out in the animals in a way that requires the ability to make extremely fine temporal comparisons.
Echolocation in the owl requires comparing extremely tiny interaural time differences between auditory signals hitting the two ears. Electroreception in the weakly electric fish requires comparing extremely tiny temporal differences between signals detected at different locations on its body. Moreover, the neural circuits that carry out these comparisons in these two animals share many common features; a fact that is not too surprising given the similarity of their functions. As a result, two separate stories about two very different organisms are discovered as a result of mutual interaction of related investigations.
In sum, we can characterize computational neuroethology as the study of naturally occurring animal behavior along with the mechanisms of its production. The techniques of investigation are wide-ranging and there seem to be no a priori limits on what techniques are available to the neuroethologist. In terms of explanatory goals, computational neuroethology seeks both to explain a wide range of animal behavior from a variety of levels of inquiry, but at the same time there is a desire to integrate these explanations by calling on properties "Neuroethology and CogSci," Keeley DRAFT: Please, do not cite. Comments welcome Page 7
shared by these varied organisms, be it evolutionary relationship, similar life-style and ecological niche, and/or shared mechanisms of behavior production.
What is the relationship between CNE and CogSci?
Computational neuroethology brings together a variety of different approaches to the study of animal behavior: 1) the neural sciences: neurophysiology, neuroanatomy, neuropharmacology, etc.-the study of the structures and processes that mediate behavior; 2)
ethology-the study of naturally occurring animal behavior, both "in the wild" and in the laboratory; 3) evolutionary biology-the study of the phylogeny of animal behavior and the structures which mediate it; 4) developmental biology-the ontogeny of animal behavior and the structures which mediate it; and 5) computational modeling-building robotic and computer simulations of animal behavior; to name the most significant constituents.
2 Bullock (1990) gives some idea of the broad scope of the field:
In the broad sense in which it is generally used today, neuroethology includes studies on protozoans and humans, reflexes and cognition, ion channels and brain/body ratios, learning in snails, and the innate understanding of squirrel monkey calls by squirrel monkeys.
[…] Neuroethology is not only concerned with causation and function. For example, how does echolocation work in terms of neurons? It is also concerned with development and evolution, in terms of molecules, motor control, and mental events. The field is inevitably both reductionist and integrative, both comparative and general, though usually not in the same study. (244) Computational neuroethology and CogSci share many affinities. First, they both ask 2. There is a good deal of discussion within neuroethology as to its proper scope, and I am explicitly siding with those who give it a broad rather than a narrow reading. For instance, one of the most vocal proponents for a limited scope for neuroethology is Graham Hoyle (cf. (1984) ) who argues that it would be best if neuroethology restricted itself to the explanation of innate behaviors in terms of single, identified cells.
Hoyle's proposal has generated more controversy than consensus. (See the responses to (Hoyle 1984) printed in the same issue, particularly (Bullock 1984) More importantly, it involves using phylogenetic relationships to make predictions about the traits of animals that have yet to be studied. This is the primary contribution of comparative research. When you know something about an organism-say, that it generates some kind of a behavior in a particular way-and you know something about its evolutionary relationship to other organisms, you automatically have a hypothesis about those other organisms:
namely, that they generate that same kind of behavior in the same way (or not if they are not appropriately related) and that similarities can be sought in ontogeny, morphology, physiology, etc. When dealing with complex nervous systems capable of carrying out complicated behaviors, this educated guess-work can be a valuable hint in the right direction.
Objections to a comparative approach to CogSci
There are several possible objections to the claim that CogSci ought to focus more attention on the comparative biology of cognition. The first objection is that most of the phenomena of interest to CogSci are too uniquely human to be open to comparative analysis, cf., Washburn & Dolhinow (1983) [***track down Gopnik ref] . According to this line of argument, reading, language, formal problem solving, and the like are behaviors that only humans exhibit. All other species lack these traits. With respect to these traits, there is nothing to be compared with non-human animals. Therefore, comparative methods cannot "get a grip" on that which most interests CogSci. It may make sense to study electroreception in a comparative context because there are a relatively large number of electroreceptive species, each of which exhibiting this sensory modality in its own specific way. However, Homo Sapiens are the only species that reads. There are no other species that read with which to compare humans.
A second objection follows from the first: Even those phenomena which are shared with other organisms-navigation in humans and insects, social behavior in humans and fish-are not (prima facie) closely related in the phylogenetic sense. Human navigation skills most likely did not evolve from the navigation skills of the common ancestor of ants and humans, so it is unclear, at best, what a comparative study of the two could ever tell us.
In response to such objections, we should first point out that they presume a non-trivial degree of comparative knowledge in the first place. We cannot identify any given trait as "uniquely human" until we have done enough comparative work to reasonably conclude that these traits are, in fact, uniquely human. Furthermore, the history of comparative biology in the past several decades, particularly primatology, has shown us again and again that what were once thought to be "uniquely human" traits are shared by other organisms. Throughout this paper I am assuming that the continuity of species and their behavior that we find in the biological world calls for a continuity of explanation of that behavior. Ever since Darwin, at least, we believe that humans are animals. For this reason, we ought to expect that the explanations we give of human behaviors have some connection to the explanations we give of non-human animal behavior. 4 I am not saying that there are no uniquely human traits. There surely are, as every species is, by nature, unique (Foley 1987) . Furthermore, it is very likely that human behavior (and the big brain that mediates that behavior) plays a large role in making humans unique.
4. Churchland & Churchland (1983 ) note that, "Representations-information-bearing structuresdid not emerge of a sudden with the evolution of verbally competent animals. As Sellars remarks, 'the generic concept of a representation admits of many gradations between primitive systems and the sophisticated systems on which philosophers tend to concentrate'. Whatever information-bearing structures humans enjoy, such structures evolved from simpler structures, and such structures are part of a system of information-bearing structures and structure-manipulating processes. If we want to understand how epistemic engines work, we might have to understand simpler systems first, and that means we cannot avoid penetrating the skull, implanting electrodes, and looking nature full in the face." (302-303).
Nevertheless, in order to understand what makes us uniquely human, we must study and understand the often subtle and not-so-obvious distinctions that separate us from the rest of the animal world. This is simply analytic. Uniqueness, just like "similarity" and "identity", is a relationship between entities. To say that one species is unique in a particular way is to make a claim about the properties of both that species and all other species. This
understanding is exactly what comparative research seeks.
It would help the present discussion to do a little conceptual analysis of traits and their phylogenetic standings. Consider, x, a trait of interest of to CogSci. Presumably, x is a trait that is possessed by humans, otherwise it would not be of interest. Now this trait will either be present in other species or it will be absent. If x is absent in all other species, I will call this trait "unique" to humans, and we will turn to it again in a moment. If x is shared with other species, then we must next ask what the probable evolutionary relationship is between humans and that other species with respect to that trait. Again, there are two possibilities. If the trait is likely to be one that is derived from the common ancestor of humans and the other animal(s), we will call the trait "homologous". If, on the other hand, it is unlikely that humans and this animal share a common ancestor that itself had the trait in question, then this trait is "analogous". (An analogous trait is thereby a product of convergent evolution.)
Returning again to uniquely human traits, we must ask whether this trait stands in some continuous relationship to traits possessed by closely-related species. We must ask, in other words, does this uniquely human trait look like any other related trait in our closest phylogenetic relatives or is it truly a unique human invention? If the former, then call the trait "unique and continuous". If the latter, then call the trait "unique and discontinuous".
Therefore, on the analysis I am offering here, human traits of interest to CogSci fall into four categories: homologous, analogous, unique & continuous, and unique & discontinuous. My reason for dividing up the space of possibilities this way is that I will argue that comparative biology has a different potential contribution for CogSci in each of these classes of traits.
Comparative evidence has a role to play in each of these categories, although it is a different role in each. Therefore, I will discuss them separately. 1) homologous: A homologous trait is one which is shared by two organisms and the most recent common ancestor of those two organisms. At least some of the traits that CogSci studies are homologous with those in other, closely-related organisms. For example, the human visual system-the study of which is a mainstay of CogSci-is to a large degree homologous with that of non-human primates. Also, the human memory system, e.g., the hippocampal complex, is apparently homologous in most vertebrates.
Homologous traits are those in which it is clearest that comparative research can further the goals of CogSci. If a certain trait is homologous in humans and some non-human animal, then that trait can be studied in the non-human animal with a good degree of confidence that findings will apply to humans as well. This is useful for several reasons. First, there are experiments we can perform on non-human animals that would be technically difficult or ethically problematic to carry out on human subjects. Single-cell recording in the visual cortex is a good example. The ethical difficulties of drilling holes in people's heads and inserting recording electrodes can probably go without comment. While doing such work on monkeys is not without ethical difficulties, such problems are reduced. Furthermore, monkey brains are in many ways just easier to work with, from a technical perspective. The increased folding of the surface of the cortex in humans, as opposed to the less folded cortical surface of monkeys, renders certain brain regions in the visual cortex relatively more accessible in monkeys. In other words, sometimes it is technically much easier to perform neurophysiological studies on non-human primates than on humans.
Therefore, the study of homologous traits, such as the visual system, in non-human animals, e.g., monkeys, can provide insight into human issues by virtue of the fact that these processes are carried out in similar ways in both humans and monkeys. This similarity is true by virtue of our shared recent ancestry. 5 This is not to say that there are no differences between primate visual systems, indeed it is the differences that make monkeys easier to work with in many ways. So, for example, the function and synaptic structure of Area V1 is probably homologous in macaques and humans, but its location in the brain may not be.
Knowledge of these differences is crucial to further our understanding of what facts learned about monkey visual processing can be transferred to humans. Hence, the importance of work such as that done by Sereno and colleagues (1995) , who use modeling and fMRI data to determine the locational and functional correspondences between primate visual areas in the cortex in a variety of different species.
2) analogous: An analogous trait is one that is shared by two organisms, but which did not evolve from a common ancestor with that same trait. We say that analogous traits are the product of convergent evolution. For example, neuroethologist Rüdiger Wehner and his colleages (1983) have spent several decades describing the incredible navigation abilities of the Saharan desert ant, Cataglyphis bicolor, an animal capable of remembering the location of its nest even as it travels several meters from home pursuing a random-walk search for food. However, even if some aspects of navigation in humans and Saharan desert ants is significantly similar, such a trait is undoubtedly analogous. It is unlikely that the extremely distant common ancestor of Homo sapiens and Cataglyphis bicolor possessed a similar trait from which the contemporary trait has evolved in both species.
What can the study of analogous traits in non-human animals tell us about that trait in humans? First, the study of analogous traits can sometimes tell us about the selection pressures that brought about the trait. Reconstructing the evolutionary history of humans is difficult because it is far from clear what environmental niche our ancestors occupied during important portions of our recent evolutionary development. Understanding this history can help explain important aspects of human behavior. 6 Exactly what kind of selection 6. Consider, for example, the recent speculation concerning the human predilection for sweet and fatty foods, even though such a diet proves detrimental for most contemporary members of our species.
Understanding that the nature of human appetites evolved in a period of history when such fatty foods were scarce and hard to acquire goes some way towards explaining our now dangerous tastes in foods (Eaton, et al 1997) .
pressures led us to have the navigation skills that we have? Hypotheses can be generated by considering the navigation skills of non-human animals-even ants-seeing what sense they make of human capacities and what little we know about human prehistory.
Second, the study of analogies can inform us about the nature of the traits themselves.
Studying analogous traits often tells us as much about the trait itself as about the organisms that possess it. This is relevant because recall that CogSci is not only interested in explaining human capacities, it is also interested in exploring the design space of mechanisms capable of generating those capacities. In this way, cognitive scientists interested in navigation behaviors in general should be interested in the unique, non-human mechanisms for skilled navigation in Saharan desert ants. These animals represent a successful and exquisite solution to the "navigation problem", and as such they occupy an interesting spot in the design space.
Finally, studying analogous traits in other, simpler organisms forces us to be clearer and more honest when assessing our theories of those traits. If we claim that a behavior requires
x, e.g., structures or processes with particular properties, then we have an expectation of finding x in a simpler organism. So, on the comparison of human and ant navigation strategies, Wehner (1983) notes, "In understanding how humans go about similar problems we are often hamstrung by the intuitive belief that our solutions are trivially obvious. Thus, there is heuristic value in studying such problems in other than human beings, and even in animals as small as insects" (366). There is value in studying organisms that solve the same (analogous) problems in different ways. 3) unique and continuous: Some traits may well turn out to be unique to humans. However, of these uniquely human traits, some will nonetheless be evolutionarily continuous with traits in other species. For example, humans are nature's foremost theorists about minds. We are highly social and spend a great deal of our lives trying to figure out what our conspecifics 7. See Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1983) for more on the benefits of studying analogous traits, particularly with respect to humans. Seen from the perspective of neuroethology, human cognitive capacities can be seen as just another animal system on this list. If we want to understand the capacity to reason about minds, then it makes sense, the neuroethologist argues, to study that organism which is renowned for its skills of reasoning about minds, in this case humans. As Heiligenberg notes, the study of such an animal system is likely to reveal the limitations of such mechanisms and provide an arena for testing hypotheses about these types of mechanisms.
Finally, the existence of continuity at the level of behavior can be helpful for studying the mechanisms which generates that behavior. Assume, for a moment that humans are indeed consummate theorists of mind, whereas non-human primates are merely less-skilled in this domain. It is not unreasonable to suppose that these behavioral differences are reflected in differences in their respective neural mechanisms, after all, we are assuming that behaviors are primarily mediated by neural activity.
4) unique and discontinuous: The final category of traits contain those which are both unique to a particular species of organism, and which are so different from all other traits that it is impossible to establish a continuous set of evolutionary stages between that trait and others.
A potential example of this kind of trait in humans is the grammaticality of human language, a trait which is arguably so different from the grammaticality of non-human communication that it has become, for some, the last refuge of those who wish to establish the unique prowess of homo sapiens. Even clearer examples are the human capacities for written language and complexly articulated speech, neither of which have clear counterparts in any other extant species.
I am tempted to throw in the towel here and concede that comparative biology has little to contribute in the study of unique and discontinuous traits. If I were to do so, I would rest on the claim that the other three types of traits adequately make the case for the potential role of comparative facts in CogSci. After all, to make an argument for comparative biology's necessity, I do not need to show that it is guaranteed to offer insight into all the questions of CogSci. However, for the sake of completeness, let me take a moment to make a case that comparative biology has a role to play in understanding even such traits as these.
The best argument that the study of non-human animals can teach us something about traits that only humans have and that are not even continuous with any non-human traits derives from the generally conservative nature of natural selection. If comparative biology has shown us anything, it is that it is very rare indeed that organisms create new traits out of whole cloth, as it were. More often than not, a new behavioral trait results from the novel application of an old mechanism. Nowhere is this more true than in nervous systems, in which old structures are continually being put to new purposes. That is to say, unique evolutionary adaptations are often carried out by homologous brain structures. This is relevant because the brain is not behaviorally flexible in the way, say, a computer is. You cannot simply erase the memory of a brain area and upload a new program that carries out some completely different task. There are structural constraints on the behavioral capacities brain regions can carry out, including, but not restricted to, the speed at which neurons can operate, the nature of their connections both upstream and downstream, and the nature of their constituent cell-types.
Therefore, even if we accept that humans are the only animals that read and write, or that have a highly developed grammar, we should ask what neural structures are mediating these behavioral properties. Chances are these uniquely human behaviors are being carried out by neural structures that are doing something different in non-human animals. If so, then studying the nature of that mechanism in non-human animals, perhaps with ethical and technical advantages, can shed light on the mechanism as it functions in humans. Consider the perhaps not so far-fetched possibility that the apparently unique and discontinuous capacity in humans for highly intricate vocalization is neurally mediated by areas of the brain which are homologous to those which, in non-human primates, are responsible for fine finger movement coordination. If this were the case, then studies on the molecular basis of the learning of fine finger movements in monkeys could provide an important model for the learning of vocal patterns in humans. So, in this imaginary example, learning that high amounts of Neurotransmitter Z leads to perseverative finger movements in our monkey model straightforwardly yields the hypothesis that a Neurotransmitter Z agonist is a potentially useful treatment for stuttering in children. This is just an imaginary example, but I suggest that it is not implausible. The point is simply that even where a behavioral trait in humans is unique and discontinuous, there is still the possibility that the mechanism responsible for that behavior is not so unique and discontinuous. In such situations, then the comparative study of the mechanism can be informed by the study of related mechanisms in non-human animals, and this understanding of the mechanism can then lead to a better understanding of the unique behavior it mediates.
Conclusion
In the discussion above, I have focussed on the value of discovering similarities between human brains and cognition and the brains and behavior of non-human animals. My argument to this point has been that comparative approach can shed light on such similarities, but it is important to keep in mind that it can also give us insight into the differences between humans and the rest of animal kingdom. Surely these differences are of interest to the Cognitive Scientist. Take for example the oft-repeated, but rarely cited, fact that humans and chimpanzees have genomes which are 98% identical. 8 That 2% difference, together with the difference between human and chimpanzee developmental environments, must account for all the differences between the two species.
What is the difference between the brains of humans and chimpanzees that accounts for our different cognitive capacities? (Note that this is a question best posed after we have a comparative understanding of exactly what those differences are.) An understanding of the cognitive nature of humans will be incomplete if it does not include an explanation of how 8. Here is a citation: Goodman (1992) demonstrates that there is a 98.4% degree of similarity between the DNA nucleotide sequences in the genera Homo and Pan. we humans are different from closely related species who happen to have very similar seeming brains. 9 The point of this paper is to remove one of the major obstacles to refashioning CogSci in the light of CNE: the comparative nature of CNE and the non-comparative nature of traditional CogSci. Specifically, I have shown the numerous ways which comparative biology can inform CogSci investigations. In doing so, I have shown that one of the most obvious differences between the approaches of CNE and traditional CogSci can be overcome.
